“Ukraine has shown that full‑scale military operations can be launched on Russian territory.” CIT founder Ruslan Leviev on the AFU Kursk campaign

How did the AFU prepare its attack on the Kursk region?

Ukrainian troops were moved to the border under the pretext of defending the Sumy region from an alleged threat of re-invasion by Russia. Separate units from several (over six) brigades, including those fighting in the Donetsk region, were deployed for the operation.

Taking advantage of the element of surprise, on August 6, they crossed the border into the Kursk region and attacked, meeting virtually no resistance. The border was guarded by border guards, the FSB and covering troops consisting of both conscripts and contractors. All of them were unprepared for an attack by such a large AFU group. Because of this, the Ukrainian forces were able to make significant advances in the first two or three days.

Later, the pace slowed considerably as the surprise factor dissipated. Russian air forces, rocket artillery and drone units began to strike AFU positions. Ukrainian forces began to entrench themselves in the captured territory and prepare for its defence. Now, the Ukrainian armed forces are attempting to move forward in separate groups and columns, though this is not always successful. Probably, the task of the current stage of the operation is to push the grey zone as far away as possible to allow Ukrainian forces to better consolidate and entrench themselves on the captured territory.

At the same time, sabotage and reconnaissance groups continue to enter other border areas, including the neighbouring Belgorod region. Most likely, this is being done to divert the attention of Russian forces from the Kursk region.

Doesn’t Russia guard its border?

During a full-scale war, the border is indeed a poorly guarded grey zone. Because of this, the HUR has conducted raids on Russian territory before, for example, using the Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK, РДК). The border is guarded by FSB border guards (who cannot stand up to heavy armoured vehicles), as well as conscripts and contract soldiers from the Border Covering Troops Group, who are inexperienced and untrained.

What territory has the AFU seized and what does it intend to do with it?

The situation remains unclear. Very limited information is coming from the Kursk region. The Ukrainian side is publishing practically no information but is skilfully creating information pressure on the Russian authorities by, for example, circulating photoshopped images allegedly from near the city of Kursk. Small sabotage and reconnaissance groups are creating the appearance of a new broad invasion by large armoured groups on neighbouring sections of the border (such as in the Belovo district of the Kursk region).

All this makes it difficult to draw definitive conclusions about the size of the territory controlled by the AFU. A number of border villages in the Kursk region are indeed under the full control of Ukrainian forces. It appears that the district centre of Sudzha is also under their control. A very rough estimate of the area of captured territories is about 400 square kilometres. This is not the same as the area of fighting, which at the moment could be as large as a thousand square kilometres. Plus, there are different degrees of control. For example, if we see Ukrainian military personnel moving freely around a populated area, removing Russian flags from administrative buildings, and using trawls to evacuate their damaged equipment, this is a clear sign that the territory is under full AFU control. At the very least, this applies to a number of border settlements.

There are territories where the Ukrainian military is present but cannot move so freely. For a long time, this was the case with Sudzha. There are also territories of episodic presence, where there are forays by small Ukrainian groups into new territories. An example is yesterday’s attempted attack on the area of the village of Giryi, 20 kilometres south-east of Sudzha.

All three of these categories add up to a war zone with a total area of up to a thousand square kilometres.

As I said, the Ukrainian forces will now be entrenching themselves on the controlled territory: digging trenches and dugouts, mining roads, and setting up observation points. They will continue raids by separate groups into new areas to give the rear in the Kursk region a better chance to entrench. Groups of saboteurs will continue to cross the border in new areas to divert the attention of the Russian forces being moved in.

What are the goals of the operation?

The Ukrainian side has not provided any specifics about the objectives of the operation. There are several theories about possible goals. But, firstly, these can change and be adjusted depending on the course of the operation and its successes. Secondly, the political leadership can always claim that whatever occurred was in fact the goal of the operation—this has happened before.

As for the possible goals of the operation, one popular hypothesis is that the aim was to exchange captured territories (in the Kursk region for the Kharkiv region or somewhere else). This is somewhat doubtful. It is difficult to imagine that this AFU operation would entice Putin into negotiations. When the front of Russian forces in the Kharkiv region collapsed in the autumn of 2022, it did not prompt Putin’s desire for any negotiations.

A more plausible theory is the partial diversion of Russian forces from other parts of the front. Since Russia does not have any operational reserves, for example, in Belgorod or other nearby regions, in order to relieve the situation in the Kursk region, it will have to remove some units from the front. We can already see how the equipment of the “North” military group under the command of General Alexander Lapin, which is fighting in the Kharkiv region, is being moved. Drone units which fought in Zaporizhzhia have also arrived in the Kursk region. But the Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia directions don’t pose the biggest threat to the AFU. The most dangerous part of the front for Ukraine now is in the Donetsk region, specifically the Toretsk and Pokrovsk direction. The Russian “Centre” group under the command of General Andrey Mordvichev is fighting there. We have not seen any movement of their units in these last days.

That being said, Ukraine had to pull out some units of its brigades fighting in the Donetsk region in order to carry out this operation. So there is a risk of adverse consequences in the Toretsk and Pokrovsk areas. So far, the actions of Ukrainian forces have had no impact on the main front. But it is too early to draw conclusions. Considering that it takes many days to transfer heavy armoured vehicles from the far sections of the front to the Kursk region, the effect could still manifest itself in the coming days.

There are other objectives that could be called “collateral.” For example, Ukraine has succeeded in significantly boosting the morale of its military and society. Since the end of last year, Russia has had the strategic initiative and the AFU have been gradually retreating. First the capture of Avdiivka, then the Russian operation in the Kharkiv region in May, then the capture of Ocheretyne and further advances on that section of the front. Now Ukraine has seized the initiative. It has been demonstrated that the Russian “red lines” are just empty threats. For a week now, NATO—including American—equipment has been driving across internationally recognised Russian territory and seizing populated areas. At the same time, no missiles with nuclear warheads are being fired at Washington or Brussels.

There was a risk that the operation would provoke a negative reaction from European allies, who have often emphasised that they are ready to help Ukraine reclaim only its own land, but “did not sign up” to support military operations on Russian territory. Nevertheless, seven days later, we have not seen any negative feedback from European officials. On the contrary, even representatives of Germany have explicitly stated that Ukraine has the right to use German equipment at its discretion, including on Russian territory. I should remind you that Germany had previously been particularly vocal in its concerns about possible escalation.

The Ukrainian army was able to improve its image in the eyes of Western allies by showing that even after two and a half years of a full-scale war, it is capable of carrying out such operations. In addition to responding to the campaign in the Kursk region, Russia will now have to form and maintain some sort of reserve on its territory to respond to such threats in a timely manner.

Another goal of the operation could be a war of attrition, modelled on the Ukrainian bridgehead at Krynki, on the left bank of the Dnipro. Many Russian paratroopers and marines were lost in the battles for Krynki. Something similar may happen in the Kursk region.

Russian authorities are announcing evacuations from some areas of the border regions. Does this mean that they are also under the threat of capture?

I would not equate evacuations from certain areas and the digging of trenches near the Kursk nuclear power plant with the imminence of Ukrainian forces entering these territories. Firstly, local authorities, not the Ministry of Defence, are responsible for evacuations. They face a difficult dilemma: if they do not evacuate people from a territory, then sabotage groups may enter, hostilities could start, destruction may begin, and hence they risk punishment for not reacting earlier.

The Russian Ministry of Defence says that the situation is under control and that they are not allowing further advances. But can we trust the Russian Ministry of Defence? Even Putin doesn’t fully believe what they are saying. And evacuating people means raising unrest because of resettlements, finding places to accommodate these people, and paying compensation. This is the situation that regional authorities are in. So if people are evacuated from somewhere, it doesn’t necessarily mean that Ukrainian forces will definitely go there, or that the Defence Ministry expects Ukrainian forces to go there.

Since the very beginning of the full-scale invasion we have been saying that it has long been necessary to evacuate the border strip in the Bryansk, Kursk, Belgorod, Voronezh, Rostov regions—all regions bordering Ukraine. Because even if there are no AFU operations there, there will always be shelling, drone flights, and possibly the actions of sabotage and reconnaissance groups.

The same goes for the digging of trenches near the city of Kurchatov, where the Kursk nuclear power plant is located. The fact that they are being dug does not mean that Ukrainian troops may reach there soon. The authorities are reacting to news reports and the state of war in general. This is normal. Digging fortifications near strategic facilities located in the border regions is the right thing to do; it should have been done since 2022.

Why did Belarus report its troop movements on the border?

This is just the usual chatter. This situation has been repeating for an unknown number of times. Moreover, the previous time ended just a few weeks ago, when [President Alexander] Lukashenko ordered the withdrawal of troops from the border with Ukraine.

Is there any reliable information about the participation of conscripts in combat in the Kursk region?

The information is sketchy. There is a group of troops covering the border, which includes conscripts from different regions. Therefore, they were and are indeed present in the border areas.

There were reports about Wagner PMC mercenaries from Africa being transferred to the Kursk region. Is that confirmed?

No, these are rumours and fake news, which are denied, among others, by pro-Wagner channels. The forces involved on the African continent are not of such a size that it would make sense to bother with logistics and transport them to the Kursk region.

Was the AFU operation worth it?

Time will tell. What matters is not what the operation is now, but what it will be in a few weeks. Besides, the Russian troops being transferred have only just begun to approach the combat zone in the Kursk region. We don’t know what scale of forces Russia will eventually deploy, and we don’t know what costs and losses the Ukrainian command is prepared to incur.

How important is this campaign in the overall course of the war?

Ukraine has seized the initiative and shown that full-scale military operations can be launched on Russian territory, using Western equipment and without consequences in the form of the “World War III” scare stories popular in the West. This is an important milestone in the course of this war.

Editor: Dmitry Treshchanin