Russian losses in the war with Ukraine.
Mediazona count, updated

In mid-May, pro-war singer Vika Tsyganova published a video of a trip to a cemetery in the village of Myshetskoye in the Moscow region. She counted 33 fresh graves of KIA soldiers there.

We’ve added everyone who is buried in this cemetery to our list. There’s actually not 33, but 34 names, and before Tsyganova released the video on her Telegram channel, we only had data on two people.

This is not a typical situation: when someone provides data from cemeteries, we usually know about a larger percentage of the dead from obituaries and other publications. So with the help of a pro-war singer, whose latest hits were the songs “Wagner”, “Give us ammo” and “Trumpet”, our tally grew considerably.

It’s worth noting that none of the KIA soldiers buried in Myshetskoye have a direct connection to the village: 26 people are from the city of Khimki near Moscow, others are from different towns across the region, as well as Izhevsk in Udmurtia and Orsk in the Orenburg region. Prior to the release of Tsyganova’s video, there were only two records in our database: Maxim Goguzev from Inta (Komi Republic) and Viktor Ushakov, who lived in Khimki, but was born in Mordovia.

Active usage of the cemetery in Myshetskoye for military burials most likely began just several months ago: judging by the dates of deaths, 23 people died after 1 November 2024.

Leaks from various Russian databases we studied suggest that most of the dead are ordinary volunteers without criminal records, who were employed by the Moscow Metro and Moscow Waterworks (both organisations are known for active recruitment of volunteers for the war). Some worked in delivery and private security firms or had the status of small entrepreneurs.

What we know about losses

Here’s how the losses are distributed across Russian regions. These are absolute numbers, not adjusted for population or number of military units.

On the map, you can choose between total losses and losses by military branch, as well as see where the deceased mobilised soldiers were from.

In most cases, from death reports or indirect signs (uniform or sleeve patches in photos), it’s possible to determine which branch of the military the deceased served in, or how they joined the army (mobilised, volunteer, prisoner, etc.)

We compared these groups of servicemen on a separate graph.

From early summer and into the mid-fall season of 2022, volunteers bore the brunt of the losses, which is strikingly different from the situation in the initial stage of the war: in winter and early spring, the Airborne Forces suffered the greatest damage, followed by the Motorised Rifle troops.

By the end of 2022 and the beginning of the next year, losses among prisoners recruited into the Wagner PMC increased markedly. They were formed into “assault groups” to overwhelm Ukrainian positions near Bakhmut.

By March 2023, prisoners became the largest category of war losses. After the capture of Bakhmut, there have been no cases of mass use of prisoners so far.

By September 2024, volunteers once again emerged as the largest category among the KIA. This shift reflects a cumulative effect: prison recruitment had significantly waned, no new mobilisation had been announced, yet the stream of volunteers continued unabated.

By April 25, the death of 5,076 officers of the Russian army and other security agencies had been confirmed.

The proportion of officer deaths among overall casualties has steadily declined since the conflict began. In the early stages, when professional contract soldiers formed the main invasion force, officers accounted for up to 10% of fatalities. By November 2024, this figure had dropped to between 2–3%—a shift that reflects both evolving combat tactics and the intensive recruitment of volunteer infantry, who suffer casualty rates many times higher than their commanding officers.

Officers killed in Ukraine

To date, reports of the deaths of two deputy army commanders have been officially confirmed—Major General Andrei Sukhovetsky of the 41st Army and Major General Vladimir Frolov of the 8th Army.

On May 22, 2022, fighter pilot, 63-year-old retired Major General Kanamat Botashev died; most likely, he went to war as a volunteer. The deputy commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Captain 1st Rank Andrei Paliy, was also killed. On June 5, 2022, the death of Major General Roman Kutuzov was reported.

In June 2023, Major General Sergei Goryachev was killed. He was the chief of staff of the 35th Combined Arms Army and commanded the repulsion of the Ukrainian counterattack in the Zaporizhzhia region.

In July 2023, the death of the first Lieutenant General was confirmed—Oleg Tsokov, deputy commander of the Southern Military District.

In November 2023, Major General Vladimir Zavadsky was killed. He was the deputy commander of the 14th Army Corps.

In November 2024, Major General Pavlo Klimenko, commander of the 5th Separate Motorised Rifle Brigade (former DPR ‘Oplot’ Brigade), died. According to the pro-Ukrainian Telegram channel Spy’s Dossier, he was fatally wounded on November 6: Klimenko was attacked by an FPV drone while riding a motorbike between command posts.

The date of death of servicemen is specified in 86,200 reports. The number of losses per day according to this data hardly reflects the real picture, but it allows us to assume on which days the battles were the most intense.

It should always be taken into account that the data of the last few weeks is the most incomplete and may change significantly in the future.

Age is mentioned in 93,000 reports. In the first six months of the war, when the regular army participated in the invasion without volunteers, mobilised soldiers, and prisoners, most deaths were in the 21–23 age group.

Volunteers and mobilised soldiers are significantly older: people voluntarily go to war at 30–35 years or older, and the mobilised are generally over 25.