How many Russian soldiers died in the war with Ukraine

Russian losses in the war with Ukraine.
Mediazona count, updated

Mediazona, in collaboration with BBC News Russian service and a team of volunteers, maintains a named list of deceased Russian military personnel. This list is compiled from verified, publicly available sources, including social media posts by family members, local news reports, and official announcements from regional authorities. This list is not exhaustive, as not every military death becomes public knowledge.

To provide a more comprehensive picture of the war’s impact, we offer a second figure: an estimate of excess mortality among men, based on Probate registry data. This method was developed in collaboration with Meduza, to address the limitations of relying solely on publicly reported deaths.

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About our reports

This publication is divided into two parts:

Bi-weekly Summary. A text summary, updated every two weeks. Here we report what we’ve learned about the losses during this time and the events at the front that led to the deaths of Russian soldiers.

Interactive Infographics. The second part showcases visual representations of losses since the beginning of the war: for example, where the deceased served or in which regions they lived. We update the data for this part; the text descriptions are updated but largely remain the same.

For a detailed description of our method for calculating the estimated number of losses based on the Probate Registry data, please follow the link.

Last update of the named list: July 4, 2025

Last update of the Probate Registry estimate: February 24, 2025; estimate as of December 2024

Full named list of verified losses is available here: 200.zona.media.

A recent update from Mediazona’s data team revealed a massive wave of criminal cases against soldiers who refuse to fight in Ukraine, known as “the 500s” (пятисотые).

By the end of May 2025, military courts across Russia had registered over 20,538 criminal cases spanning various criminal articles connected with refusing to serve: unauthorized absence from a military unit, disobeying a direct order, desertion.

Military investigators and prosecutors have hit a peak operational tempo, sending approximately 1,000 new cases to the courts every month. Judges are handing down convictions at a rate of 700 to 800 each month, with April 2025 alone seeing 848 verdicts, an average of 38 decisions for every working day.

This, however, represents only the instances that reached by the court system. The actual number of Russian soldiers refusing to fight in Ukraine is considerably higher, as many instances, especially on the front lines, do not result in criminal proceedings; instead, numerous reports and footage detail brutal extralegal treatment.

Also, the court statistics only include those who were caught. This is a predictable result of a protracted war built on forced mobilisation, indefinite contracts, and volunteers who, upon facing the reality of the front, seek any way to escape.

It is also important to understand that these 20,000-plus men cannot be unequivocally counted as losses for the Russian army. This cruel system is organised in such a way that allows a suspended sentence to be converted into the soldier being sent back to the front, often to punitive stormtrooper units where the chances of survival are slim.

What we know about losses

Here’s how the losses are distributed across Russian regions. These are absolute numbers, not adjusted for population or number of military units.

On the map, you can choose between total losses and losses by military branch, as well as see where the deceased mobilised soldiers were from.

In most cases, from death reports or indirect signs (uniform or sleeve patches in photos), it’s possible to determine which branch of the military the deceased served in, or how they joined the army (mobilised, volunteer, prisoner, etc.)

We compared these groups of servicemen on a separate graph.

From early summer and into the mid-fall season of 2022, volunteers bore the brunt of the losses, which is strikingly different from the situation in the initial stage of the war: in winter and early spring, the Airborne Forces suffered the greatest damage, followed by the Motorised Rifle troops.

By the end of 2022 and the beginning of the next year, losses among prisoners recruited into the Wagner PMC increased markedly. They were formed into “assault groups” to overwhelm Ukrainian positions near Bakhmut.

By March 2023, prisoners became the largest category of war losses. After the capture of Bakhmut, there have been no cases of mass use of prisoners so far.

By September 2024, volunteers once again emerged as the largest category among the KIA. This shift reflects a cumulative effect: prison recruitment had significantly waned, no new mobilisation had been announced, yet the stream of volunteers continued unabated.

By July 4, the death of 5,285 officers of the Russian army and other security agencies had been confirmed.

The proportion of officer deaths among overall casualties has steadily declined since the conflict began. In the early stages, when professional contract soldiers formed the main invasion force, officers accounted for up to 10% of fatalities. By November 2024, this figure had dropped to between 2–3%—a shift that reflects both evolving combat tactics and the intensive recruitment of volunteer infantry, who suffer casualty rates many times higher than their commanding officers.

Officers killed in Ukraine

To date, reports of the deaths of two deputy army commanders have been officially confirmed—Major General Andrei Sukhovetsky of the 41st Army and Major General Vladimir Frolov of the 8th Army.

On May 22, 2022, fighter pilot, 63-year-old retired Major General Kanamat Botashev died; most likely, he went to war as a volunteer. The deputy commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Captain 1st Rank Andrei Paliy, was also killed. On June 5, 2022, the death of Major General Roman Kutuzov was reported.

In June 2023, Major General Sergei Goryachev was killed. He was the chief of staff of the 35th Combined Arms Army and commanded the repulsion of the Ukrainian counterattack in the Zaporizhzhia region.

In July 2023, the death of the first Lieutenant General was confirmed—Oleg Tsokov, deputy commander of the Southern Military District.

In November 2023, Major General Vladimir Zavadsky was killed. He was the deputy commander of the 14th Army Corps.

In November 2024, Major General Pavlo Klimenko, commander of the 5th Separate Motorised Rifle Brigade (former DPR ‘Oplot’ Brigade), died. According to the pro-Ukrainian Telegram channel Spy’s Dossier, he was fatally wounded on November 6: Klimenko was attacked by an FPV drone while riding a motorbike between command posts.

The date of death of servicemen is specified in 91,900 reports. The number of losses per day according to this data hardly reflects the real picture, but it allows us to assume on which days the battles were the most intense.

It should always be taken into account that the data of the last few weeks is the most incomplete and may change significantly in the future.

Age is mentioned in 99,500 reports. In the first six months of the war, when the regular army participated in the invasion without volunteers, mobilised soldiers, and prisoners, most deaths were in the 21–23 age group.

Volunteers and mobilised soldiers are significantly older: people voluntarily go to war at 30–35 years or older, and the mobilised are generally over 25.

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