Russian losses in the war with Ukraine.
Mediazona count, updated

Alexander Borodai, State Duma deputy Alexander Borodai, head of the “Union of Donbas Volunteers” and former leader of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic, has confirmed the authenticity of an audio recording shared widely across loyalist channels, where he makes stark comments on the role of Russian recruits sent to the front lines in Ukraine.

Borodai said that the recording captures a private conversation from 2023, in which he discussed the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ counteroffensive with three officers. In it, he speaks about recruiting volunteers for the front—describing them as “old men” and “weaklings” from whom “not even the smallest victory” is expected. These recruits, he notes, are armed with outdated, limited equipment, with their primary task being “to exhaust the enemy to the max.”

In the conversation, Borodai refers to such volunteers as “spare people”—those “who didn’t find themselves as civilians,” relatively older individuals whom he categorises as the “unproductive” part of the population.

Mediazona has published a full transcript of this monologue.

Borodai’s remarks reflect the battlefield reality we observe. As we have reported, the bulk of Russian combat losses in 2024 have come from volunteer forces, with relatively fewer casualties seen among the professional army.

Currently, the role of these volunteers has expanded beyond containing Ukrainian forces to include participation in so-called “meat-grinder assaults.” In his remarks, Borodai describes this as a temporary measure until Russian authorities streamline recruitment and establish reserves for a “significant offensive operation.” Obituaries suggest these reserves are being drawn from similar social groups.

Alexander Borodai’s involvement in the Ukraine conflict is both complex and influential. The son of a philosopher, Borodai holds a degree in philosophy himself and is known for his hard-line nationalist rhetoric. A former journalist and political operative, Borodai was one of the primary figures to engage in the conflict in eastern Ukraine in 2014, eventually taking on the role of self-proclaimed Prime Minister of the Donetsk People’s Republic. He held the position until August of that year, when he stepped down as part of a reshuffle intended to project a more local leadership. Since then, Borodai has shifted to a primarily organisational role, overseeing recruitment for Russian forces in the Donbas and managing logistical support.

What we know about losses

Here’s how the losses are distributed across Russian regions. These are absolute numbers, not adjusted for population or number of military units.

On the map, you can choose between total losses and losses by military branch, as well as see where the deceased mobilised soldiers were from.

In most cases, from death reports or indirect signs (uniform or sleeve patches in photos), it’s possible to determine which branch of the military the deceased served in, or how they joined the army (mobilised, volunteer, prisoner, etc.)

We compared these groups of servicemen on a separate graph.

From early summer, volunteers bore the brunt of the losses, which is strikingly different from the situation in the initial stage of the war: in winter and early spring, the Airborne Forces suffered the greatest damage, followed by the Motorised Rifle troops.

By the end of 2022 and the beginning of the next year, losses among prisoners recruited into the Wagner PMC increased markedly. They were formed into “assault groups” to overwhelm Ukrainian positions near Bakhmut.

By March 2023, prisoners became the largest category of war losses. After the capture of Bakhmut, there have been no cases of mass use of prisoners so far.

By September 2024, volunteers once again emerged as the largest category among the KIA. This shift reflects a cumulative effect: prison recruitment had significantly waned, no new mobilisation had been announced, yet the stream of volunteers continued unabated.

By October 25, the death of over 4,300 officers of the Russian army and other security structures had been confirmed.

Officers killed in Ukraine

To date, reports of the deaths of two deputy army commanders have been officially confirmed—Major General Andrei Sukhovetsky of the 41st Army and Major General Vladimir Frolov of the 8th Army.

On May 22, 2022, fighter pilot, 63-year-old retired Major General Kanamat Botashev died; most likely, he went to war as a volunteer. The deputy commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Captain 1st Rank Andrei Paliy, was also killed. On June 5, 2022, the death of Major General Roman Kutuzov was reported.

In June 2023, Major General Sergei Goryachev was killed. He was the chief of staff of the 35th Combined Arms Army and commanded the repulsion of the Ukrainian counterattack in the Zaporizhzhia region.

In July 2023, the death of the first Lieutenant General was confirmed—Oleg Tsokov, deputy commander of the Southern Military District.

In November 2023, Major General Vladimir Zavadsky was killed. He was the deputy commander of the 14th Army Corps.

The date of death of servicemen is specified in 58,800 reports. The number of losses per day according to this data hardly reflects the real picture, but it allows us to assume on which days the battles were the most intense.

It should always be taken into account that the data of the last few weeks is the most incomplete and may change significantly in the future.

Age is mentioned in 64,900 reports. In the first six months of the war, when the regular army participated in the invasion without volunteers, mobilised soldiers, and prisoners, most deaths were in the 21–23 age group.

Volunteers and mobilised soldiers are significantly older: people voluntarily go to war at 30–35 years or older, and the mobilised are generally over 25.