This publication is divided into two parts:
Bi-weekly Summary. A text summary, updated every two weeks. Here we report what we’ve learned about the losses during this time and the events at the front that led to the deaths of Russian soldiers.
Interactive Infographics. The second part showcases visual representations of losses since the beginning of the war: for example, where the deceased served or in which regions they lived. We update the data for this part; the text descriptions are updated but largely remain the same.
For a detailed description of our method for calculating the estimated number of losses based on the Probate Registry data, please follow the link.
Last update of the named list: April 25, 2025
Last update of the Probate Registry estimate: February 24, 2025; estimate as of December 2024
Full named list of verified losses is available here: 200.zona.media.
Last week, Vladimir Putin declared an “Easter truce”, which lasted just over 24 hours. Ukraine agreed to it on the condition of a reciprocal response: “silence for silence, fire for fire.”
Following the truce, both sides exchanged accusations of violating it. At the end of the ceasefire, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General Oleksandr Syrskyi, summed up the results, claiming that the Russian army had violated the ceasefire a total of 2,935 times. Most of the shelling was reported in the Pokrovsk and Kursk directions. According to Syrskyi, there were around one hundred ground assaults, about 800 incidents of shelling with heavy weapons, and just under a thousand drone attacks.
On the morning of April 21, the Russian Ministry of Defence issued counter-accusations. According to its report, Russian troops had adhered to the ceasefire until the end of the agreed period. It claimed that Ukrainian forces had launched drone and artillery strikes on Russian positions and civilian targets in the border regions, a total of 4,900 ceasefire violations.
Due to the delay in publishing and processing obituaries, we cannot yet report how many servicemen were killed during the days of the truce. However, we can analyze the previous similar ceasefire during Orthodox Christmas on January 6 and 7, 2023.
At the time, the situation on the front lines was different: Wagner PMC still retained formal autonomy and was not yet subordinated to the Ministry of Defense. On January 6, the mercenaries launched an operation to capture the town of Soledar: it was one of the key phases of the battle for Bakhmut. During the “truce” the Wagner fighters managed to capture more than 3 square miles, or 8 square kilometres, (according to data from the Ukrainian project Deepstate) around Soledar and entered the town itself.
Obituaries with confirmed dates of death show that at least 274 Russian soldiers were killed over those two days.
The graph shows no discernible dip in casualties during the “ceasefire” days. Ukrainian losses, which we cite according to data from the anonymous UALosses project, were slightly below average on January 6, but not unusually low either.
Another data source backs this up: losses recorded among Wagner fighters. Not all those killed are included in our named database, as many are listed only by their call signs or nicknames. Nonetheless, available figures suggest that Wagner alone lost 149 men on January 6 and another 180 on the 7th—a total of 329 over two days. That number exceeds the confirmed total in the main dataset.
Despite public statements by both sides accusing the other of numerous violations during the declared Easter truce, the situation this time was markedly different. In many parts of the front, fighting did indeed stop. In at least one instance, Russian and Ukrainian troops even coordinated to evacuate the bodies of fallen soldiers from one of the recent battles.
Here’s how the losses are distributed across Russian regions. These are absolute numbers, not adjusted for population or number of military units.
On the map, you can choose between total losses and losses by military branch, as well as see where the deceased mobilised soldiers were from.
In most cases, from death reports or indirect signs (uniform or sleeve patches in photos), it’s possible to determine which branch of the military the deceased served in, or how they joined the army (mobilised, volunteer, prisoner, etc.)
We compared these groups of servicemen on a separate graph.
From early summer and into the mid-fall season of 2022, volunteers bore the brunt of the losses, which is strikingly different from the situation in the initial stage of the war: in winter and early spring, the Airborne Forces suffered the greatest damage, followed by the Motorised Rifle troops.
By the end of 2022 and the beginning of the next year, losses among prisoners recruited into the Wagner PMC increased markedly. They were formed into “assault groups” to overwhelm Ukrainian positions near Bakhmut.
By March 2023, prisoners became the largest category of war losses. After the capture of Bakhmut, there have been no cases of mass use of prisoners so far.
By September 2024, volunteers once again emerged as the largest category among the KIA. This shift reflects a cumulative effect: prison recruitment had significantly waned, no new mobilisation had been announced, yet the stream of volunteers continued unabated.
By April 25, the death of nearly 5,000 officers of the Russian army and other security agencies had been confirmed.
The proportion of officer deaths among overall casualties has steadily declined since the conflict began. In the early stages, when professional contract soldiers formed the main invasion force, officers accounted for up to 10% of fatalities. By November 2024, this figure had dropped to between 2–3%—a shift that reflects both evolving combat tactics and the intensive recruitment of volunteer infantry, who suffer casualty rates many times higher than their commanding officers.
Officers killed in Ukraine
To date, reports of the deaths of two deputy army commanders have been officially confirmed—Major General Andrei Sukhovetsky of the 41st Army and Major General Vladimir Frolov of the 8th Army.
On May 22, 2022, fighter pilot, 63-year-old retired Major General Kanamat Botashev died; most likely, he went to war as a volunteer. The deputy commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Captain 1st Rank Andrei Paliy, was also killed. On June 5, 2022, the death of Major General Roman Kutuzov was reported.
In June 2023, Major General Sergei Goryachev was killed. He was the chief of staff of the 35th Combined Arms Army and commanded the repulsion of the Ukrainian counterattack in the Zaporizhzhia region.
In July 2023, the death of the first Lieutenant General was confirmed—Oleg Tsokov, deputy commander of the Southern Military District.
In November 2023, Major General Vladimir Zavadsky was killed. He was the deputy commander of the 14th Army Corps.
In November 2024, Major General Pavlo Klimenko, commander of the 5th Separate Motorised Rifle Brigade (former DPR ‘Oplot’ Brigade), died. According to the pro-Ukrainian Telegram channel Spy’s Dossier, he was fatally wounded on November 6: Klimenko was attacked by an FPV drone while riding a motorbike between command posts.
The date of death of servicemen is specified in over 82,200 reports. The number of losses per day according to this data hardly reflects the real picture, but it allows us to assume on which days the battles were the most intense.
It should always be taken into account that the data of the last few weeks is the most incomplete and may change significantly in the future.
Age is mentioned in 89,200 reports. In the first six months of the war, when the regular army participated in the invasion without volunteers, mobilised soldiers, and prisoners, most deaths were in the 21–23 age group.
Volunteers and mobilised soldiers are significantly older: people voluntarily go to war at 30–35 years or older, and the mobilised are generally over 25.
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