This publication is divided into two parts:
Bi-weekly Summary. A text summary, updated every two weeks, in which we report on what we have learned about recent losses and the frontline events that led to the deaths of Russian soldiers.
Interactive Infographics. The second part provides visualisations of the losses since the start of the war, showing, for example, where the dead served or which regions they came from. We update the data for these graphics, while the accompanying text is refreshed but remains largely the same.
A detailed description of our method for estimating total deaths using Probate Registry data can be found at this link.
Last update to the named list: April 24, 2026.
Last update to the Probate Registry estimate: August 29, 2025; estimate as of August 2025
Full named list and a map of verified losses is available here: 200.zona.media.
Over the past two weeks, we’ve added over 5,000 people to our list. This isn't related to the current situation at the front: we processed social media posts about missing service members and confirmed their deaths through official state databases (for example, the probate registry).
As before, we don’t count missing persons in our reports, they are a separate category that’s virtually impossible to track. We use posts about missing service members as a source of full names and as proof that the individual participated in the war. We then check the registries to see if a person with that full name has already been declared dead, and if so, we add them to our tally.
In other words, our methodology hasn’t changed: we only count confirmed dead persons.
Since we’ve accumulated a large number of entries added this way, we’ve slightly modified the source link system for such cards in the published list of names on 200.zona.media (in Russian).
Now, the record for a person found through a missing person post will contain a link to such a post, along with a note indicating that the death was confirmed via official sources. Previously, such records simply stated “death confirmed in state registries.”
We’ll also be working to add as many public links as possible to other records so readers can verify our work.
The map below shows the distribution of casualties across Russia’s regions. These are absolute figures and have not been adjusted for population or number of military units.
You can filter the map to show total losses, losses by branch of service, or the home regions of mobilised soldiers who were killed.
In most cases, official reports or visual cues like uniforms and insignia allow us to determine a soldier’s branch of service, or how he came to be in the army (mobilised, volunteer, prisoner, etc.).
The chart below compares these different groups of servicemen.
From early summer and into the mid-fall season of 2022, volunteers bore the brunt of the losses, which is strikingly different from the situation in the initial stage of the war: in winter and early spring, the Airborne Forces suffered the greatest damage, followed by the Motorised Rifle troops.
By the end of 2022 and the beginning of the next year, losses among prisoners recruited into the Wagner PMC increased markedly. They were formed into “assault groups” to overwhelm Ukrainian positions near Bakhmut.
By March 2023, prisoners became the largest category of war losses. After the capture of Bakhmut, there have been no cases of mass use of prisoners so far.
By September 2024, volunteers once again emerged as the largest category among the KIA. This shift reflects a cumulative effect: prison recruitment had significantly waned, no new mobilisation had been announced, yet the stream of volunteers continued unabated.
By April 24, 2026, the death of 7,043 officers of the Russian army and other security agencies had been confirmed.
The proportion of officer deaths among overall casualties has steadily declined since the conflict began. In the early stages, when professional contract soldiers formed the main invasion force, officers accounted for up to 10% of fatalities. By November 2024, this figure had dropped to between 2–3%—a shift that reflects both evolving combat tactics and the intensive recruitment of volunteer infantry, who suffer casualty rates many times higher than their commanding officers.
Officers killed in Ukraine
To date, the deaths of 15 Russian generals have been officially confirmed: five Lieutenant Generals, seven Major Generals, two who had retired from active service, and one Ukrainian SBU general who had fled to Russia.
Lieutenant General Oleg Tsokov, deputy commander of the Southern Military District, was killed in July 2023—the first officer of that rank to die in the war. In December 2024, Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov, head of the Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Protection Troops, was killed by a bomb in Moscow. Lieutenant General Yaroslav Moskalik, a senior officer in the General Staff’s Main Operational Directorate, was killed by a car bomb in a Moscow suburb in April 2025. In December 2025, Lieutenant General Fanil Sarvarov, head of the Operational Training Directorate of the Russian General Staff, was killed in Moscow by a car bomb. On March 31, 2026, Lieutenant General Alexander Otroschenko, commander of the mixed aviation corps of the Northern Fleet, was killed in the crash of an An-26 transport aircraft in Crimea.
Two deputy army commanders, Major General Andrei Sukhovetsky (41st Army) and Major General Vladimir Frolov (8th Army), were killed in the first weeks of the war. In June 2022, Major General Roman Kutuzov was killed in an attack on a troop formation.
Major General Sergei Goryachev, chief of staff of the 35th Combined Arms Army, was killed in June 2023 while commanding forces against the Ukrainian counter-offensive in the Zaporizhzhia region. In November 2023, Major General Vladimir Zavadsky, deputy commander of the 14th Army Corps, was killed near the village of Krynky.
In November 2024, Major General Pavel Klimenko, commander of the 5th Separate Motorised Rifle Brigade (formerly the “Oplot” Brigade of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic), was fatally wounded by an FPV drone.
In July 2025, a strike on the headquarters of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade killed at least six officers, including the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, Mikhail Gudkov.
The two retired generals on the list are Kanamat Botashev, a pilot who had been dismissed for crashing a fighter jet and was fighting for Wagner PMC when his Su-25 was shot down in May 2022, and Andrei Golovatsky, a former Interior Ministry general serving an 8.5-year prison sentence who was killed in June 2024.
The date of death is known in 194,800 cases. While this data does not capture the full daily reality of the war, it does suggest which periods saw the most intense fighting.
Please note that the data of the last few weeks is the most incomplete and may change significantly in the future.
The age of the deceased is mentioned in 197,670 reports. For the first six months of the war, when the fighting was done by the regular army, the 21-23 age group accounted for the most deaths.
Volunteers and mobilised men are significantly older: people voluntarily go to war over 30, and the mobilised are generally over 25.
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The raid lasted 13 hours, concluding after midnight Moscow time