Russian losses in the war with Ukraine.
Mediazona count, updated

In the final weeks of 2024, Telegram channels began circulating numerous videos showing Russian soldiers conducting assaults in civilian cars, rather than armoured vehicles. Pro-war milblogger accounts mentioned that UAZ “Bukhanka” vans and other civilian cars were not just being used for logistics but also in offensive operations.

At the start of the war, Russia enjoyed a massive advantage in terms of military hardware, especially tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. Thousands were in active service, while thousands more were held in long-term storage. Much of this equipment was inherited from the Soviet Union and had been kept in reserve.

As the conflict progressed, storage depots began to empty. Vehicles were transported to armoured repair plants, where they were restored, sometimes partially upgraded, and dispatched to the front lines.

YouTuber Covert Cabal has been closely monitoring these storage bases since the war began. Using purchased high-resolution satellite images, he painstakingly counts the number of armoured vehicles still on-site. His most recent report suggests that Russia has removed at least 52% of its tanks, 48% of its IFVs and airborne combat vehicles, and 55% of its armoured personnel carriers and MT-LB vehicles during the war. Detailed data can be found in this Google spreadsheet.

Researchers observing these trends note that most of the remaining stock is in poor or dire condition. Only 279 tanks were found to be in what could be considered “decent” shape. The rate of withdrawals has also slowed significantly in 2024. The T-90 tank has completely disappeared from storage, and nearly all T-80s have been deployed. However, substantial reserves of T-72s—albeit in outdated configurations—remain.

According to the Oryx, an OSINT project performing visual confirmation of military equipment, Russia has lost around 3,700 tanks during the war. Yet, researchers caution against expecting the Russian armed forces to run out of tanks entirely. Despite the heavy losses, Russia produces approximately 200 to 250 new armoured vehicles each year.

Nevertheless, in 2025, military commanders will face a choice: either scale back the offensives or find substitutes for the dwindling supply of armoured vehicles. The use of civilian vehicles like the infamous “Bukhankas” in combat appears to be an early indication of this forced economisation.

The shift to using civilian vehicles in assaults will inevitably lead to increased casualties. Civilian vans and cars are lack the durability of armoured vehicles, while offering no protection to their crews or passengers against landmines, drones, or artillery strikes.

What we know about losses

Here’s how the losses are distributed across Russian regions. These are absolute numbers, not adjusted for population or number of military units.

On the map, you can choose between total losses and losses by military branch, as well as see where the deceased mobilised soldiers were from.

In most cases, from death reports or indirect signs (uniform or sleeve patches in photos), it’s possible to determine which branch of the military the deceased served in, or how they joined the army (mobilised, volunteer, prisoner, etc.)

We compared these groups of servicemen on a separate graph.

From early summer and into the mid-fall season of 2022, volunteers bore the brunt of the losses, which is strikingly different from the situation in the initial stage of the war: in winter and early spring, the Airborne Forces suffered the greatest damage, followed by the Motorised Rifle troops.

By the end of 2022 and the beginning of the next year, losses among prisoners recruited into the Wagner PMC increased markedly. They were formed into “assault groups” to overwhelm Ukrainian positions near Bakhmut.

By March 2023, prisoners became the largest category of war losses. After the capture of Bakhmut, there have been no cases of mass use of prisoners so far.

By September 2024, volunteers once again emerged as the largest category among the KIA. This shift reflects a cumulative effect: prison recruitment had significantly waned, no new mobilisation had been announced, yet the stream of volunteers continued unabated.

By January 17, the death of over 4,600 officers of the Russian army and other security agencies had been confirmed.

The proportion of officer deaths among overall casualties has steadily declined since the conflict began. In the early stages, when professional contract soldiers formed the main invasion force, officers accounted for up to 10% of fatalities. By November 2024, this figure had dropped to between 2–3%—a shift that reflects both evolving combat tactics and the intensive recruitment of volunteer infantry, who suffer casualty rates many times higher than their commanding officers.

Officers killed in Ukraine

To date, reports of the deaths of two deputy army commanders have been officially confirmed—Major General Andrei Sukhovetsky of the 41st Army and Major General Vladimir Frolov of the 8th Army.

On May 22, 2022, fighter pilot, 63-year-old retired Major General Kanamat Botashev died; most likely, he went to war as a volunteer. The deputy commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Captain 1st Rank Andrei Paliy, was also killed. On June 5, 2022, the death of Major General Roman Kutuzov was reported.

In June 2023, Major General Sergei Goryachev was killed. He was the chief of staff of the 35th Combined Arms Army and commanded the repulsion of the Ukrainian counterattack in the Zaporizhzhia region.

In July 2023, the death of the first Lieutenant General was confirmed—Oleg Tsokov, deputy commander of the Southern Military District.

In November 2023, Major General Vladimir Zavadsky was killed. He was the deputy commander of the 14th Army Corps.

In November 2024, Major General Pavlo Klimenko, commander of the 5th Separate Motorised Rifle Brigade (former DPR ‘Oplot’ Brigade), died. According to the pro-Ukrainian Telegram channel Spy’s Dossier, he was fatally wounded on November 6: Klimenko was attacked by an FPV drone while riding a motorbike between command posts.

The date of death of servicemen is specified in 66,700 reports. The number of losses per day according to this data hardly reflects the real picture, but it allows us to assume on which days the battles were the most intense.

It should always be taken into account that the data of the last few weeks is the most incomplete and may change significantly in the future.

Age is mentioned in 74,300 reports. In the first six months of the war, when the regular army participated in the invasion without volunteers, mobilised soldiers, and prisoners, most deaths were in the 21–23 age group.

Volunteers and mobilised soldiers are significantly older: people voluntarily go to war at 30–35 years or older, and the mobilised are generally over 25.